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INDIANA'S CONSTITUTION AND THE PROBLEM.
OF ADMISSION TO THE BAR
Did Constitutional Convention of 1850 Actually Mean to Prohibit Requiring Educational
Qualifications in Applicants for Admission ?-Examination of Journal and Debates
Supports Contrary Inference-"Good Moral Character" as a Phrase of Chang-
ing Content to Be Given a Present-Day Meaning*
By BERNARD C. GAVIT
Professor in Indiana University School of Law
T would seem that the necessity of an adequatelegal education as a prerequisite for admission
to the Bar should have become an accepted stand-
ard of individual and public conduct. It would
seem that to defend or expound the validity of such
a standard ought to be "wasted energy": that one
ought to be able to assert that "the proposition is
so well settled that the court does not feel called
upon to cite authority to sustain it."
The truth is, however, that there is respectable
(but in all kindness, mistaken) opinion to the con-
trary. Each attempt to amend the indiana Consti-
tution to specifically allow the use of such a stand-
ard in passing on applications for admission to the
Bar has disclosed some persons actively opposed to
the proposed change "upon principle." The present
time is no exception, and we find some lawyers.
judges and laymen more or less actively opposed
to any amendment to the constitution or any legis-
lation or judicial action looking to such a change.
It has, therefore, been thought desirable to re-
examine the proposition, with the hope of convinc-
ing both those who are opposed, or uninterested,
and to place the argument and data for the affirma-
tive of the proposition before the lawyers and citi-
zens of the State.
So far as I know no one has been officially
appointed to reply to these arguments. It is neces-
sary, therefore, for me to state the views of the
opposition. But I hasten to asure you that I have
no illusion that I have thereby any real advantage.
I appreciate that this is a gathering of free Amer-
ican Lawyers, enslaved with the idea that nobody
shall be permitted to get away with anything, nor
shall he be permitted to do all of the talking, es-
pecially for both sides.
But so far as I have been able to discover the
arguments against an adequate legal education as
a requirement for admission to the Bar are these:
1. We have got along without it for more
than a hundred years: why change?
2. It was unneeded eighty years ago: there-
fore it is unneeded now.
3. It necessarily fails to take care of the ex-
ceptional individual who might become a valued
lawyer and citizen were he permitted to pursue his
ambitions unhindered by such a requirement.
4. It creates a monopoly.
5. Upon principle it is fundamentally wrong.
When this subject was assigned to me last
winter it was assumed that the citizens of the state
*Address delivered before the Annual Meeting of the Indiana State
Bar Association, July 10 and 11.
would be voting on a constitutional amendment
providing for educational qualifications for admis-
sion to the Bar. Since that time is has been settled
that because of defects in the legislative action pro-
posing the amendment the question will not be
submitted to the voters this fall. And in view of
the slight probability which exists as to the calling
of a constitutional convention it would almost seem
as if one might well plead a failure of consideration
as to the subject matter of this paper.
In reply, however, it is submitted that the sub-
ject is of present interest to the Bar and public,
and if it is not it ought to be. For the fact is that
for some time a committee of this association has
been at work preparing a bill to be submitted to
the legislature regulating admissions to and demis-
sions from the Bar.
A bill of this character will be presented to this
meeting and the next session of the legislature; so
that we are in truth faced with the task of educat-
ing ourselves and the public upon this subject.
Such a procedure (that is, legislative action)
necessarily involves a specific question of consti-
tutional law, which must be settled first. Our con-
stitution provides that "Every person of good moral
character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admis-
sion to practice law in all courts of justice." Does
this take from the legislature and the courts the
power, which otherwise they admittedly have, to
regulate this subject to this extent?
It is submitted that although there has been
a quite general assumption that that question must
be answered in the affirmative, that a critical sur-
vey of the constitutional convention proceedings
and the cases decided under this section, and of
the principles involved, results in the conclusion
that the question must be answered in the negative.
Two propositions falsely have been assumed
to be true: first, that the Constitutional Convention
of 1850 and 51 actually intended to prohibit edu-
cational qualifications: second, that "good moral
character" today does not include an educational
qualification.
As to the first. So far as I can find no one
has ever taken the trouble to investigate the facts
upon which the proposition rests. As a- question
of constitutional interpretation I think we must
concede that in some instances the intention of the
framers of the constitution is material. When we
have before us a question of legislative interpreta-
tion the pet phrase that the problem involved is
one of arriving at the legislative intent has little if
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any substance to it. The rule is a starting point,
or a point of departure, rather than in any sense
a rule of guidance. However, there seems to be a
little more substance to it when a question of
constitutional interpretation is involved, and (for
the sake of argument) it may be conceded that the
actual specific intention -or purpose of the framers
of the constitution might be material. That is, the
question is ("good moral character" being some-
what vague and ambiguous in its meaning), did
the convention say the same thing as if it had said"good moral 'character and without any educational
qualifications"? If we may inquire if that were its
actual intention (but embodied in the shorter phrase
"good moral character") we must seek evidence
of that intent in the proceedings of the Conven-
tion.
That is, we start out with the proposition that a
constitutional provision is to receive a fair inter-
pretation, on the basis of the language used. If
the language does not have a settled or unambigu-
ous meaning, the proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention may be investigated for evidence to
sustain one or the other of possible meanings. That
is, the couit re-writes the phrase to remove the am-
biguity. The question is not, how would -the Con-
vention have decided this case, but how would the
Convention have expressed the principle involved
had the ambiguity been brought to its attention.
Suppose then that we concede (for the sake of
argument) that the phrase in question is ambiguous
within the meaning of the rule, what evidence is
there to aid in its proper re-drafting by the court?
The truth is that the evidence on the point is
meager and conflicting, but to my mind, if it proves
anything at all it disproves the common assumption
on the point. I think that the only fair inference
as to the actual intention of the convention is that
it did not specifically intend to prohibit an educa-
tional requirement for admission to the bar. Had
the point been specifically put to the convention it
would not have re-written the phrase to read "good
moral character, but without educational qualifica-
tions."
There are only two sources of information
which can be considered legally, (and so far as I
know they are the only actual sources of informa-
tion). These are the Journal of the Constitutional
Convention and the Debates in the Constitutional
Convention, both published under the authority of
the convention. They do not agree in all respects
as to what transpired, but I fail to see how any
more credence can be given to one report than the
other. There is no express conflict in the reports
(except in one minor instance): the disparity ap-
pears in one reporting proceedings which the other
does not and this disparity is easily accounted tor.
For the purpose at hand there seems to be no re-
course but to accept both reports as supplementing
each other, and we must deal with them as if each
were accurate so far as each goes.
In view of a reference in the convention to the
existing law on the subject it is well at this time to
discuss it. It was governed by chap. 38, Sec. 90-114
of the Revised Statutes of 1843. Sec. 90 provided
that no person should be permitted to practice as
an attorney at law, without having first obtained
a license from two of the judges of the Supreme
Court or from two circuit judges. The latter
license did not permit practice in the Supreme
Court. Sec. 92 provided that "no person shall be
entitled to receive a license until he has obtained
a certificate from the 'circuit court of some county
of his good moral character." The balance of the
provisions deal with the recording of the license,
the taking of an oath, the penalties for violation of
the act and the powers and removal of attorneys.
It is very apparent that the certificate as to good
moral character was only one condition to the grant
of a license. There was a general grant of power
to the courts to grant licenses, without specifying
any conditions and then later, and in a separate
section of the act there was a condition to the effect
that the applicant for a license obtain and present
a certificate as to his good moral character from
some circuit judge (presumably) acquainted with
it. The result clearly would be that the courts had
both inherent and implied granted power to impose
any other reasonable conditions they saw fit. That
is, the law is that a general grant of power to
license, without specifying all of the conditions as
to its exercise vests in the licensing body discre-
tionary power to impose reasonable terms and con-
ditions upon the exercise of it. (17 R. C. S. p. 527;
L. R. A. 1915 C. p. 1097, et seq.). There can be no
question but that prior to 1852 ordinary good moral
character was but one of the qualifications for the
practice of the law, and the courts were free to,
and undoubtedly did, exercise discretion as to the
other qualifications of an attorney. As we shall
see we have a remark in the convention by a promi-
nent attorney which substantiates that interpreta-
tion of the act.
The convention assembled October 7, 1850,
and adjourned February 10, 1851. The provision
in question did not come up until rather late in the
session. On January 18, 1851 Samuel Frisbie, dele-
gate from Perry County (he was a lawyer: Vol. 3,
Monks, Courts and Lawyers of Indiana, p. 1143)
moved the adoption of a resolution "that the coni-
mittee on the practice of law and law reform, be
instructed to report a section, that every free white
male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, and of
good moral character, shall be permitted to practice
law in any and all courts of this state, whether of
record or not of record." (Journal, p. 710-711. De-
bates p. 1673.)
James W. Borden, chairman of that committee,
(delegate from Allen County and a lawyer and
judge of some consequence, C. & L. I. p. 319, 339,
540, 541, 548, 551, 647, etc.) suggested that the reso-
lution should go to the committee on courts of
justice. "Several voices. No. No. The subject
belongs to law reform." The resolution was
adopted.
The committee on law reform was composed
of James W. Borden, Chairman, (Allen County, a
lawyer): Joseph Ristine (Fountain County, a
lawyer afterwards a judge, C. & L. of I. p. 343);
Thomas W. Gibson (Clark County, no informa-
tion); Daniel Kelso (Switzerland County, a lawyer
and afterwards prosecuting attorney, C. & L. of I.
p. 559, 579, 787, 792, 893, 919, 981, 1031): Samuel
Hall (Gibson County, a lawyer and judge of some
prominence, C. & L. of I. p. 81): David Wallace,
(Marion County, a lawyer, former governor, legis-
lator, congressman, and afterwards judge of the
court of Common Pleas. C. & L. of I. p. 79, 81, 91,
112, 338): John S. Newman (Wayne County, a
lawyer, and later President of the Indiana Central
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Railway. C. & L. of I. p. 1209): Grafton F.
Cookerly (Vigo County, no information); Robert
C. Kendall (White County, no information):
Joseph H. Mather (Elkhart County, a lawyer and
former prosecuting attorney. C. & L. of I. p. 666,
817, 827, 833, 865, 952, 995). Daniel Read (Monroe
County, no information): Walter March (Grant
and Delaware counties; no information): William
S. -olman (Delaware County, a lawyer, the son
of Jesse L. Holman, one of the three original jus-
tices of our Supreme Court, a legislator, circuit
judge and for thirty years a member of congress.
C. & L. of I. p. 187, 320, 337, 436, 642, 669, 687, 985,
1005, 1049).
Of the thirteen members of the committee
which drafted the section as it was finally adopted
eight of them were lawyers, and among them were
included some of the most substantial and influ-
ential members of the convention.
On January 27th Mr. Borden reported the fol-
lowing section: "Any person of good moral char-
acter and possessing the right of suffrage, shall be
entitled to admission to practice in all the courts
of this state," which report was concurred in and
the section read a first time and passed to second
reading. (Journal, p. 796; Debates, p. 1853). It is
to be noted that this section left out the provision
of the original resolution concerning free white
males, and put in that the person was to be "en-
titled to admission to practice." As proposed the
section was that he be "admitted to practice." In
view of later action in the convention this change
is very pertinent.
On January 31st the section was read a second
time. Ross Smiley (Fayette County, no informa-
tion) moved to strike out the words "be entitled to
admission" and insert the words "have a right."
Mr. Thomas Butler (Green County, no informa-
tion) moved to lay the section and amendment on
the table.' The amendment was tabled, and the
section passed to third reading. There was no dis-
cussion on the proposed amendment. (Journal, p.
860: Debates p. 1961).
Apparently one member at least thought there
was some difference between "be entitled to, admis-
sion" and "have a right" to practice and the fair in-
ference is that the committee thought there was a
difference: for it had changed the language from
"entitled to practice" to "entitled to admission to
practice." Whether the difference was thought to
be one of substance or of form it is impossible ac-
curately to tell. One is left entirely to inference,
and that we shall discuss later.
The Debates report no other proceedings at
this time, but the Journal reports the following
additional proceedings: Mr. John Davis (Madison
County, possibly a lawyer, C. & L. of I. p. 319)
moved to -insert after the words "suffrage" the
words "and requisite qualifications."
Mr. Alexander C. Stevenson (Putman County,
no information) moved a call of the previous ques-
tion.
Mr. George W. Moore (Owen County, no in-
formation) moved to lay the amendment on the
table, which was decided in the affirmative. The
inference from this we shall also discuss later.
On February 1st the section was read a third
1. In the Debate it is Mr. Frisbie who makes this motion, and
he was the original proposer: and this is the only conflict in the reports
in the Debates and the Journal.
time. The Journal reports merely that it was
passed by a vote of 84 to 27 (p. 879). The Debates
report the following proceedings2 (pp. 1971-72):
The section was read a third time. (What follows
is a verbatim copy of the Debates) Mr. Kelso (a
member of the committee which drafted it, and a
lawyer) : "The section ought to be amended by the
striking out of two words, and I hope the conven-
tion will agree to the amendment by unanimous
consent. The words are 'to admission.' The sec-
tion contemplates that there shall be an examina-
tion. I would prefer that it should be in this form,
that any man of good moral character and possess-
ing the right of suffrage shall be entitled to practice
in all of the courts of this state."
Several members. "Consent! Consent !"
Mr. Kelso. "I do not care one farthing about
it. Take the section as it stands, it just amounts
to what the law now is."
The President. "The gentleman will send up
his amendment in writing."
Mr. Kelso. "Yes, sir. I will send it up in
writing."
"I move that the section be recommitted with
instructions to strike out the words 'to admission.' "
Mr. Borden (Chairman of the committee and
a lawyer of prominence.) "I ask whether it is the
intention of this provision that a man who knows
nothing about the law at all, will be permitted to
come into court and practice law?"
A voice. "Lay members for instance."
Mr. Borden. "I move that the section be laid
upon the table." (Much confusion here prevailed
throughout the chamber.)
Mr. Robert H. Milroy. (Carroll County, a
lawyer and judge, C. & L. of I. p. 582, 585, 590, 691,
755, 878, 960, 1073, 1127) demanded the previous
question.
The demand for the previous question was
seconded.
The main question was ordered to be now put.
The president (without noticing the motion of
the gentleman from Allen, Mr. Borden), said: "The
main question is upon the passage of the section."
A member. "I want the yeas and nays upon
this question."
Mr. Schuyler Colfax (St. Joseph County, a
newspaper man: later congressman and Vice-
President of the United States. C. & L. of I. p.
434). "The previous question I think brings the
convention to a vote first upon the motion to re-
commit."
A voice. "There has been no motion to re-
commit."
Mr. Colfax. "There certainly was such a mo-
tion, and it was made from the gentleman from
Switzerland" (Mr. Kelso).
Mr. John Pettit (Tippecanoe County, a lawyer
of great prominence: former U. S. District Attorney
and Congressman; later a U. S. Senator; Chief
Justice of Kansas and a member of the Indiana
Supreme Court. C. & L. of I. p. 92). "The motion
to recommit was made to my certain knowledge."
Mr. Johnson Watts (Dearborn County, there
were three John Watts', who were lawyers and
judges in this county, and this may have been one
of them. C. & L. of I. p. 84, 628, 635, 712, 1151).
2. And this discrepancy can be explained by the fact that because
no further official action was taken, the Journal quite properly omitted
what the Debates has properly included.
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"I make a point of order. The gentlemen of the
bar have no right to vote upon this question be-
cause they are personally interested."
The President (laughing). "Members of the
legal profession will be excused from voting."
Mr. Thomas W. Gibson (a member of the com-
mittee). "I would inquire whether an amendment
could now be made, by universal consent."
The President. "Not under the operation of
the previous question."
Mr. Gibson. "As the proposition at present
stands, it gives the right to practice law to any
person."
A voice. "Possessing the right of suffrage."
"It strikes me that this is too broad."
The question then, according to ruling of the
chair, being upon the adoption of the section, the
yeas and nays were taken. Yeas, 84, Nays, 27. The
section 'was referred to the committee on revision,
arrangements and phraseology.
Of the members of the convention heretofore
mentioned Colfax, Cookerly (of the committee),
Frisbie (the original proposer of the section), Gib-
son (of the committee), Holman (semble), Kelso
(semble), Kendall (semble), March (semble),
Smiley (who had moved to substitute "right to"
for "entitled to admission") voted for the section.
It is to be noticed that Kelso, Smiley and Gibson,
who had wanted to amend the section nevertheless
voted for it as it stood. Wallace and Hall were
the only members of the committee who voted
against it; while Borden, Ristime, Newman and
Read, members of the committee, did not vote.
On February 10, 1851, the committee on re-
vision reported the final draft (Debates p. 2066)
and the only change 'which had been made was
that "being a voter" was substituted for "and pos-
sessing the right of suffrage." (Debates, p. 2073.)
The convention had appointed a committee to
prepare an exposition of the new constitution to be
circulated among the people of the state. This
"Address to the Electors" was presented and ap-
proved February 8th (Journal, p. 963, Debates p.
2042). There was no word of explanation offered
on the section in question. It was merely set out
in the language of the constitution. (Debates, p.
2044.)
What was the actual intention of the conven-
tion? In view of the fact that there was no argu-
ment, no attempt to explain the purpose of the
section, the only expressed intention is in the lan-
guage used. The actual intention or the specific
purpose of the convention on the proposition that
the section must be re-written to prohibit a re-
quirement of legal education, is left to inference
and conjecture. The most unfavorable conclusion
which can be drawn from the proceedings is that
the convention had no specific intention or purpose
on the subject, and we are therefore driven to a
fair interpretation of the language used. On the
other hand it would seem that the fair inference
from what transpired is that the committee and
the convention did not intend to make ordinary
good moral character and voting the qualifications
to the implied exclusion of legal education.
It will be noted that as originally proposed the
section was aimed partially at least against any
colored invasion of the bar, for the convention was
anti-negro and submitted sections prohibiting negro
suffrage and negro immigration into the state which
were adopted. Too, on January 25th Mr. Watts
proposed a section providing that "every legal
voter of good moral standing shall be allowed to
practice law." A voice: "Did the gentleman say
every negro voter?" Mr. Watts: "Yes, if the gen-
tleman can find any." After some argument, di-
rected primarily at the good faith of Mr. Watts
(it was offered as an additional section to the article
on Reform and Procedure), the proposal was with-
drawn. (Debates, p. 1713, et. seq.)
The section which was adopted was changed
to leave out "white niale." But this change may
have been made upon the assumption that the con-
stitution would prohibit negro suffrage, and that
the prohibition would therefore be included in the
word "voter." Certainly there is something to be
said, however, for the proposition that originally
the section may have been aimed solely at negro
lawyers.
What are the other inferences from what little
was said about it during the convention? It passed
first reading without comment, although it had
been changed by the committee. On the second
reading Ross Smiley (no information) moved to
substitute "have a right" for "be entitled to ad-
mission" and thus restore the section substantially
to its wording as originally proposed. It is ap-
parent that at least one member and the committee
thought there was a difference. It may have been
thought to be only a matter of form: or it may
have been thought to be one of substance. But in
ordinary parlance "having a right" to do a thing
is the equal of its meaning in legal parlance. It
means "right" and not something less. It may be
that in substance it means the same as being "en-
titled to admission" to do a thing. I think Mr.
Smiley and the committee thought it did not. The
reason is that if it were merely a matter of form
the change would not have been suggested (so far
as Mr. Smiley is concerned) : for the procedure
was on final adoption of any section to refer it to
a committee on revision and phraseology. It
would seem fair to infer that at least this one indi-
vidual thought as Mr. Kelso thought, when he
later stated that "to be entitled to admission"
meant to be entitled to take an examination for
admission, and this by inference is the position of
the committee, for it had inserted the phrase and,
as shown by the later proceedings, the two mem-
bers of the committee who actually expressed a
view stated that it contemplated an examination.
In any event if the convention were so hostile to
the legal profession as it is sometimes represented,
and was really intent on prohibiting legal educa-
tion as a qualification for admission to the bar, it
seems quite reasonable that it would have adopted
Mr. Smiley's motion, and changed the language
from one of ambiguity to the ordinary mind, to one
of certainty. It would seem that the fair inference
here is that the convention was not intent on pro-
hibiting legal education as a qualification, and it
was quite willing to allow an interpretation to the
contrary.
At this point the Journal reports that Mr.
John Davis moved to insert "and requisite qualifi-
cations." This apparently was to make the section
certain as against an interpretation that it did not
require a legal education. The amendment was
tabled without discussion. What is the fair infer-
ence from this? It might well be that the conven-
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tion wished to exclude legal education as a quali-
fication; it could also well be that it thought the
present language plain enough to the contrary.
In view, however, of the fact that the conven-
tion immediately prior to this had refused to amend
the section to make clear the opposite meaning,
and that it here refused to specifically add these
words, we give the opposition the benefit of every
doubt when we say that the fair inference is that
it was willing to let the matter rest on the language
as used. That is, it refused to take either side. It
was, in other words, willing at least to leave the
phrase "good moral character" open to future fair
construction.
On third reading it is clear from what Mr.
Kelso and Mr. Borden said that both of those gen-
tlemen, who were members of the committee which
drafted the section did not understand that the
section prohibited legal education as a qualifica-
tion for admission to the bar. Mr. Kelso moved to
strike out "entitled to," because the section as writ-
ten "contemplated an examination"; and he also
expressed the view that the sections but stated the
existing law (which as we have seen clearly made
good moral character only one of the conditions for
admission). And the convention was against him.
He had asked for unanimous consent to make the
amendment; there were but several voices of "con-
sent." He then was also convinced that the con-
vention was against a change, for-he said it made
little difference, as the section stated the existing
law. So here we have his opinion that the existing
law did require legal education; that the section
contemplated an examination, and a record that
the convention was very definitely against a change
to exclude it.
Mr. Borden expressed surprise that Mr. Kelso
should wish to amend the section in this manner
and allow "a man who knows nothing about the
law at all" to practice law, and moved to table the
section.
Apparently there was quite a little excitement
at this point in the proceedings and the reporter
states that the President overlooked both the pro-
posed amendment and Mr. Borden's motion and
took a vote on the section as it was.
We have here the first and the only clear-cut
actual expression in the convention, and it is em-
phatically to the effect that the section did not
exclude legal education: that an examination and
legal education could also, and presumably would,
be added by the courts or the legislature.
And this interpretation is by fair inference
fastened upon the convention as a whole. At this
point, if the -convention did not know it before, it
learned that the chairman of the committee which
drafted the section, and one of the members, both
of them lawyers, interpreted the section to be not
exclusive of legal education in its requirements.
Mr. Kelso mustered very little support for his
amendment and finally the convention did nothing
to correct the chair and bring about a vote on Mr.
Kelso's amendment. It seems wholely ,unlikely
that if the convention was so anti-educated-lawyer
as has been assumed and asserted, it would not
have taken the occasion again to change the sec-
tion to meet its mind.
On the other hand, Mr. Gibson, a member of
the committee, apparently thought the language
too broad, and desired to offer some amendment
to correct it, but he was not permitted to do so,
the previous question having been voted. Whether
he thought it too broad on the voting provision,
or on the other is not disclosed. If it were the
latter it would seem that here again the inferences
are somewhat equal, Mr. Gibson's utterances
counteracting that of Kelso and Borden. But in
view of the fact that the convention was in a posi-
tion to act against Mr. Borden's and Mr. Kelso's
suggestion, and was in no position to sustain Mr.
Gibson's view, the more importance must be at-
tributed to the former.
In the Address to the Electors nothing is said
about the section. The address does laud the sec-
tion for the reform of procedure: and it would
seem that if the convention thought it had accom-
plished anything new in the section in question
some advertising on that score would have been
forthcoming also. Again the inference is against
the assumption that the purpose or result was to
prohibit legal education as a qualification.
Although the inferences as to the actual inten-
tion of the convention are to a degree conflicting,
certainly it can only be said that the more in num-
ber and the more in reason support the result that
the cohvention did not intend nor purpose to speci-
fically prohibit legal education as a qualification:
and that on the contrary it did intend to merely
state the law as it was and leave the qualifications
in addition to voting and ordinary good moral char-
acter to the courts and legislature. We might even
say that the section sets out the minimum and not
the maximum requirements, and means that if one
does have those qualifications he can not be kept
out for those reasons. As a practical matter the
section so construed means little and is somewhat
of an idle gesture.
But that, of itself, is no conclusive argument
against the interpretation. The truth is that the
constitution was not framed by masters of constitu-
tional law. And other sections have been con-
strued to be practically meaningless. The one
which provides that "all courts shall be open: and
justice shall be administered freely and without
purchase" is a notable example.
On the whole I think that results is not en-
tirely satisfactory, if for no other reason than that
it is based on a specific intention of the conven-
tion founded wholly on inference. But if we throw
it out for that reason 'we must in the same heave
throw out the specific intention of the convention
to the contrary, for there is more evidence to sup-
port the first than there is to support the latter.
So I think we can even be generous and ad-
mit that after all, if the specific intent and purpose
here is material it is not to be discovered; or at
least that the information is so meagre that finally
the inferences sink into conjectures insufficient to
prove either side of the argument (although they
'do favor the conclusion heretofore reached). Cer-
tainly there is no evidence which 'would justify a
court in re-writing the section to read "good moral
character, but without legal education."
We then get back to the proposition that the
problem is to be settled by a fair construction of
the language used: and after all the convention
seems to have adopted that attitude.
It is submitted that the section is susceptible
to any one of three interpretations. 1. It is a grant
of a constitutional right to any voter with good
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moral character to practice law. 2. It is a limita-
tion on the power of the courts and legislature to
make any thing less than suffrage and good moral
character the qualifications for admission to prac-
tice. That is, it sets a minimum standard. 3. It is
a limitation on the power of the courts and legis-
lature to make anything more than suffrage and
good moral character a qualification for admission
to practice. That is, it sets a maximum standard..
It reallv makes no difference which view is
taken, because the solution of the problem at hand
turns in any event on the proper meaning today
of the phase "good moral character." But it is
submitted that the third interpretation is the most
reasonable one, and is after all the one which has
in a majority of the decided cases been placed upon
the section.
If we take the first it is clear that such a right
is no different from any other right, and would be
subject to reasonable regulation. It would, there-
fore, be competent for the legislature or the courts,
to define "good moral character" to include legal
education and such a definition would certainly be
a reasonable regulation. The fact that one's right
or privilege is a constitutional one does not add
much to its value as against an exercise of reason-
able regulation by a proper body. For example it
is well settled that the right or privilege to engage
in interstate commerce is subject to regulation: as
is also the privilege of a non-resident to use the
courts of a state under the privileges and immuni-
ties clause: as is also the right acquired under the
patent law: (Patterson v. Ky. 97 U. S. 501, 1879-).
As is also the right to vote and the right to a jury
trial.
If we take the second nothing stands in the
way of a similar regulation, for the constitution sets
only a minimum standard. That is, it is a check
on the power of the court and legislature to make
something less than suffrage and good moral char-
acter a test for admission. As has been suggested
heretofore such an interpretation is not impossible,
nor even unreasonable, although the practical re-
sult be to make the section a form of words merely;
but that interpretation is, as we shall see, precluded
by possibly the latest decisions of the Supreme
Court.
The least that can be said as to the third inter-
pretation is that it has been tacitly accepted by the
Supreme Court in the last two cases.
The decisions under this section are very few
and are as follows:
In McCracken v. State, 27 Ind. 491 (1867), the
question arose as to whether an act of 1865 pro-
hibiting a county recorder from practicing law was
or was not in conflict with the section in queston.
It was held that it was not for the reason that the
act in question was not a regulation of the qualifica-
tions of attorneys, but a regulation of the qualifi-
cations of recorders. The result is, of course, that
there is added to the constitutional qualifications,
the legislative qualification that the person be not
also a recorder, and that the section is not exclu-
sive. The reason given is facetious. Whether the
decision could be sustained upon the ground that
under a proper interpretation of the entire constitu-
tion, the grant of power to regulate qualifications
for public office was an implied limitation on the
section in question, is open to doubt. So sustained,
however, the decision has no bearing on the pres-
ent inquiry. Otherwise it is a distinct authority
that the section sets only minimum qualifications,
and it is impliedly overruled by later cases. But
as it stands, if anything, it is an authority for us.
The next case, Exr parte Walls, 73 Ind. 95
(1880), is a case of disbarment, but in it "good
moral character" is defined. The special findings
in this case disclosed that the attorney had robbed
and cheated his clients, but that in his business rela-
tions with other (not his clients) he was honest
and upright. In answer to the argument that the
latter was the test of his "good moral character"
and not the first, the court said: "It requires much
more than mere honesty and uprightness in busi-
ness relations outside of a profession, to constitute
a good moral character. Such btsiness relations
might admit even of the grossest misconduct and
immorality in the practice of his profession, and
does not exclude even crime." That is, good moral
character here means character as it affects the at-
torney's capacities as an attorney only. The de-
cision belies the common assumption that "good
moral character" as used in the constitution means
solely a matter of ordinary and commonplace per-
sonal rectitude. Here is a decision which says it
means "character" as it affects attorney and client
and the public. The case is a valuable authority
for us, and is really about all the authority we need.
In In re Petition of Leach, 134 Ind. 665 (1893)
the court held that a woman, although not a voter
could be admitted. The reason given was that the
constitution "secured the right of the voter of good
moral character" but did not deny the right to one
with less qualifications. It takes the first inter-
pretation suggested above. I think it is a strained
construction; but it contains nothing against us,
for admitting that the constitution gives a right
to every voter of "good moral character," such a
right ought in any event to be subject to reasonable
regulations; and there is still left over the proper
interpretation of "good moral character."
In In re Denny, 156 Ind. 104 (1900) there was
involved the question of the adoption of a consti-
tutional amendment giving the legislature author-
ity to regulate admission to practice. The Marion
Cicuit Court had apparently adopted regulations
for admission which included an examination of
some sort. It found that the applicant was a per-
son of good moral character and a voter, but the
applicant refused to submit to the examination and
as a conclusion of law the -court stated that he was
not entitled to admission. The court said "If the
proposed amendment has not been adopted, the
conclusion of law and the judgment cannot be sus-
tained."
The case decides either that there was a con-
stitutional right denied, or that the court's regula-
tions were invalid, being beyond its jurisdiction.
At best it is a weak authority, for it was apparently
admitted, or assumed that the regulations were
invalid unless supported by the constitutional
amendment; and all of the argument was directed
to the proposition as to the adoption of the con-
stitutional amendment. Apparently the attorneys
for the appellee were so confident of their proposi-
tion that the amendment had been properly adopted
that they didn't argue the other proposition: illus-
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trating again the old truth that it is dangerous busi-
ness to carry all your eggs in one basket.
The case is in no sense a decision against us,
tor the trial court specifically found that the appli-
cant was a person of good moral character. By no
stretch of the imagination could it be said to be
decisive of a case where the court would find that
he was not a person of good moral character be-
cause he did not possess an adequate knowledge of
the law to permit him honestly to represent him-
self to be an attorney.
In In re Boswell, 179 Ind. 292 (1912) the same
question was again presented. The court says, "It
appears from special findings of facts and conclu-
sions of law made and stated by the trial courts
that the petitioner was possessed of all the quali-
fications necessary for admission to practice law
under the provision of the constitution so long in
force . . . and it also appears . . . that the
court refused to admit the petitioner solely upon
the assumption that the proposed amendment had
been carried-thus leaving the court free to make
rules requiring qualifications additional to those
prescribed by the original constitutional provision,
which it had done, and with which the petitioner
could not comply."
The case is no stronger than the Denny case.
Both cases seem to be on the theory that the con-
stitution sets a maximum standard; and as a matter
of constitutional interpretation that, on the whole,
seems to be the fairest -construction to be placed
on the section. There is nothing in either case to
the effect that the applicant was kept out by rea-
son of a lack of legal education. For all that ap-
pears he may have been kept out for any number
of reasons, which could have nothing to do with
his good moral -character as an attorney.
But if the assumption be that the application
was denied on the sole ground of a lack of legal
education, again there is no decision that after all
such lack goes to the question of good moral char-
acter. And even if it were so decided then, the
cases would not be controlling today, for "good
moral character" is a phrase with a changing con-
tent. (There is nothing in any of the other cases
material to the issue. They turn on the questions
of procedure.)
And so we come to the crucial point in the
case. It is submitted that there is no evidence that
the convention intended that "being a voter and
having good moral character" should be forever
read as "being a voter and having a good moral
character, and specifically having no legal educa-
tion." In no event did it intend to prohibit legal
education as a qualification if it squared with good
moral character. And the question never is, as to
how the convention would have decided a specific
case: for if it were, "voter" then and "voter" now
would necessarily mean the same, although obvi-
ously they mean different things, for today a negro
may be a voter; but the convention would have had
no trouble in excluding him, because he was not a
voter. The difference is between reading in some-
thing to clarify an ambiguous phrase, on the ground
of an actual intention and asking how would the
convention or people would have decided this par-
ticular case at that time without reference to the
language they used. That is, if the phrase "entitled
to admission to practice" if one has "good moral
character" is ambiguous, we may clarify it by evi-
dence of what the convention would have said had
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the ambiguity been called to its attention, but as
we have seen there at best is no reliable evidence
upon which to base a redrafting of the section. The
question then is, what is the fair interpretation
today of the language used; and the manner in
which the -convention might have decided the spe-
cific case before the court is wholly immaterial.
So the problem finally simmers down to what
is meant, by "good moral character." It is clearly
a phrase of changing content. There are few
phrases in the constitution which mean today what
they meant (in content) in 1852. No principle of
constitutional construction is better ,established.
In the case of Weems v. U. S. (217 U. S. 349, 373)
Mr. Justice McKenna said this: "Legislation, both
statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true,
from an experience of evils, but its general language
should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the
form that evil had heretofore taken. Time works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must
be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth. This is peculiarily true of con-
stitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments,
designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to
use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, 'designed
to approach immortality as nearly as human insti-
tutions can approach it.' The future is their care
and provisions for events of good and bad ten-
dencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the
application of a constitution, therefore, our con-
templation cannot be only of what has been but of
what may be. Under any other rule a constitution
would indeed be as easy of application as it would
be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general
principles would have little value and be converted
by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas.
Rights declared in word might be lost in reality
and this has been recognized. The meaning and
vitality of the constitution have developed against
narrow and restrictive construction."
The Justice goes on to point out the varying
application of the 14th amendment, and only re-
cently in the case of Ambler v. Village of Euclid
(272 U. S. 365) (where a general zoning ordinance
was upheld) the court gives point to the principle
by itself admitting that twenty-five years before
it most likely would have reached an opposite re-
sult. Admittedly "due process of law" twenty-five
years ago probably is not "due process of law" to-
day (outside of the field of procedure).
In our own constitution the phrase "common
schools" occurs. In 1857 in the case of the City of
Lafayette v. Jenners (10 Ind. 70, 78) the Supreme
Court said that an academy (or high school) was
not a "common school" within the meaning of the
constitution. Today it is conceded that the high
schools of the state are part of the "common
schools" provided for by the constitution. (See,
Robinson v. Schenck, 102 Ind. 307 (1885) and State
v. O'Dell, 187 Ind. 84 (1918). And within the past
few months our Supreme Court has very correctly
decided that what was "garbage" ten years ago is
not "garbage" today. (Jansen Farms v. City of
Indianapolis. 171 N. E. 199). If such a lowly com-
modity as "garbage" is subject to the changes
brought about by science and business it ought to
be doubly apparent that "good moral character"
can have a new significance in keeping with the
moral progress of the race. If we are not tied to
our grandfathers' ideas on garbage, by the same
sign we most certainly ought not to be tied to their
ideas on "good moral character" in an attorney.
The Weems -case above is an excellent example
for the purpose at hand. It involved the applica-
tion of a clause in the constitution of the Philip-
pines prohibiting cruel and inhuman punishment.
The court reviews all of the cases and points out
that the phrase has received (on the whole) an en-
lightened construction. The courts do not, and
ought not to, go back to enquire what would the
convention, or even the people of that time, have
thought of this: but the inquiry is. what is cruel
and inhuman punishment as to this date, in the
light of human views on the subject at this time.
Thus it is conceded, that whipping, branding and
capital punishment for minor offenses would today
be cruel and inhuman; although they were not in
1789. Mr. Justice McKenna says this (p. 378):
"The clause of the 'constitution in the opinion of
the learned commentators may be therefore pro-
gressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by humane justice." The court therein
held an imprisonment of fifteen years under ball
and chain and hard labor, for a minor offense, to be
cruel and inhuman punishment. A court even fifty
years before would have had no difficulty in reach-
ing an opposite result.
Can there be any doubt but that the phrase
"good moral character" is likewise one subject to
a new meaning as public opinion becomes more en-
lightened? I can find but one case defining the
phrase, as involved here. In In re Spenser, (22
Fed. Cas. 92, Fed. Cas No. 13234, 5 Sawy. 195)
Mr. Justice Deady, said this (the question was as
to the good moral character of an applicant for citi-
zenship) : "What is a 'good moral character'
within the meaning of the statute may not be easy
of determination in all cases. The standard may
vary from one generation to another, and probably
the average man of the country is as high as it can
be set. In one age of the country duelling, drink-
ing and gaming are considered immoral, and in an-
other they are re'arded as very venial sins at most."
Is it not true that public opinion can change
and has changed as to what constitutes good moral
character in an attorney? The test is not what
would a court have done in 1852 nor even in 1912,
nor vet even in 1929; it is, what is the proper appli-
cation of the section today?
(To be concluded in next issue)
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INDIANA'S CONSTITUTION AND THE PROBLEM
OF ADMISSION TO THE BAR*
(Concluded from September issue)
FTER all is it not true that in view of thecomparative ease with which a young man or
woman can acquire a legal education today,--
the three hundred persons examined for admission
to the bar in New York last year who did not have
a college education in preparation for their legal
education were asked if they would have managed
to get a college education had it been required, and
everyone answered "yes,"-that one who wishes to
practice without it shows a weakness of character,
shows further an absolute dishonesty, as measured
by present standards, so that we can unequivocally
say that he does not have a good moral character?
We have no difficulty in saying that an attorney
who collects $100 belonging to his client, and ap-
propriates it to his own use is unfit to be an at-
torney. But suppose he takes $100 from him upon
the representation that he is learned in the law, and
although ignorant on the subject, advises him as
to his legal rights, whereby the client loses $10,000,
is he really not more of a criminal than in the first
illustration? Those of you who have had occasion
to observe the workings of the carpenters, the rail-
road porters and the street-car conductors who
have been admitted to practice law, simply because
so far they had had no occasion to steal from a
client and they had therefore a so-called good moral
character-as a conductor but not as an attorney-
know that that latter illustration is not far-fetch ed,
but that in truth it is enacted in Indiana every
week of the year.
We are concerned, as was pointed out in the
Walls case (73 Ind. 95) with his good moral char-
acter as an attorney and not in any other capacity.
Do we have to prove to anyone at this date that
one who wants to represent himself to be an at-
torney, when he is not one in fact, is wanting in
moral fibre to the extent that his mere application
ought to bar his admission? That instead of'prac-
ticing law such a one is practicing fraud?
And the facts prove that that is more than idle
theory. I was chairman of the Committee on
Grievances of the Lake County Bar Association
for a year. I investigated fourteen or fifteen com-
plaints, and not one involved an attorney who
should have been admitted in the first instance;
each one being very deficient in legal education.
But more important than those observations
are the two or three authentic instances in which
a jury has specifically decided that an applicant for
admission to the bar without legal education is not
a person of good moral character. What better
evidence could there be than that public opinion on
the question has progressed since 1852?
The conclusion must be that legislation, or
court regulation, on the subject would be consti-
tutional.
This conclusion can in truth be supported
upon any one of three propositions: first, that the
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constitution gives a "right" to one being a voter
and of good moral character, since as we have seen
such a right is subject to reasonable regulation in
any event, and the phrase "good moral character"
is open to present day application; and on these
grounds there would be permitted a requirement of
legal education, either as a reasonable regulation,
or as part of "good moral character." Second, that
the constitution sets a minimum standard, or im-
poses but two conditions for admission to practice
which may be added to. There is ample support
for this view in the proceedings of the Constitu-
tional Convention and in the first two cases decided,
but on that point it probably must be conceded
that those cases are impliedly overruled by the last
two. If the proposition were to be re-examined,
however, a very forceful argument could be made
to sustain the proposition that the first cases were
right and the last ones wrong. After all is said and
done the substance of the proceedings of the con-
vention seems to be that it intended to make "vot-
ing" and "good moral character" two preliminary
conditions only; that is, if one possessed those
qualifications he was then "entitled to admission,"
or present himself for examination. On the basis
of the convention proceedings a court could very
reasonably take that view. On the other hand one
may take the third interpretation, that is, that the
constitution sets a maximum standard, and reach
the same result. One may say quite categorically
today that one who wishes to attempt to practice
law without requisite knowledge and training has
not a good moral character. It is after all a ques-
tion of common honesty upon which reasonable
men cannot differ.
There remains to be considered briefly the
facts and the policy assumed against the proposed
change. Those opposed to it say that we have got
along for one hundred years or more without it,
why change? And the short answer to that is that
it isn't so. We have not got along without it. Our
law has been administered during all those years,
in so far as it has been properly, or approximately
so administered, by men who through self-educa-
tion and legal education in easier doses have been
learned in the law. Legal education since 1816 has
in fact at every instance been a condition precedent
to every success on the bench or at the bar. You
can as well have an airplane without an engine and
wings, as you can have a real lawyer or judge with-
out a wide and deep knowledge of the law. You
can as well eat chicken without having it, as you
can practice law without knowing any law.
It is true that we have put up with many
miserable failures on the bench and at the bar, and
to the point that we have become so 'calloused that
in some quarters at least we have a fatalistic inhibi-
tion as a result. Our environment seems to some
to have so strong a hold on our characters that we
believe it futile to attempt to rise above it. We
cannot expect progress from that class, any more
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than we can expect the peasantry of China to set
up a new order of things there. But we can expect
that this group shall say that we are through with
the injustice which results from the old system,
and that this group shall take the lead in making
legal education not only the insurer of success at
the bar, but make it a prerequisite for admission.
And have we not already answered the second
argument-that legal education was unnecessary
eighty years ago, when the constitution was
adopted, therefore it is unnecessary now? Again,
it was as necessary then as now. It is true that its
form has changed. Then it was obtained in a law
office, and in the practice; now for the most part is
it obtained in law schools and the practice. Then
law schools were few and far between, for the most
part inaccessible, and on the whole offered little
real advantage over office study. Then the body
of the law was slight and simple as compared to its
present proportions and complexities. Then
lawyers and judges were dealing with law in
frontier civilization. Times have changed, and
with it have changed the amount and content of
law and the manner in which .a student is to ac-
quire knowledge of it. But the very real necessity
for such a knowledge and the acquisition of the
power of legal reasoning for the purpose of applying
it is increasingly apparent. Eighty years ago a
student learned his law primarily in the practice,
and to a certain extent, at the expense of his clients.
Today, the question fairly is: is there any real
necessity for a young lawyer learning all of his
law at the expense of his clients? The obvious
answer is, "no." Opportunities for his education
at his own expense and that of the state are so
plentiful that the old system has been abandoned
in all but rare instances.
Indiana is alone in its present situation and the
glaring ugliness of it is graphically set out in the
article by Richard Tinkham in the June issue of
the Indiana Law Journal. Three of our ninety-two
counties make good faith efforts to regulate admis-
sions to the Bar! Standards of education in other
states have been set higher and higher each year.
Standards in law schools have had a corresponding
rise. Everywhere else there has been action vital-
izing the self-evident truth that a knowledge of the
law is the lawyer's sole tool. Other states will not
allow him to attempt to work without it.
And then it is urged that such standards would
keep out the exceptional individual, too poor to
secure the necessary education. If that were true
it might well be said that such a case falls in that
rather large class of cases where "it's just too bad."
Any rule which is in any real sense a rule may seem
unjust in its application to exceptional cases, but
the latter must bow to the obvious general benefits
which flow from the applicatibn of the rule in the
9,999 cases out of the 10,000. But the real answer
again is, it isn't so! There is no exceptional indi-
vidual today, however poor he may be, who cannot
with comparative ease and generous assistance ac-
quire an education. If he have the mind and the
ambition which the phrase "exceptional individual"
imports, his education is assured him.
This last semester there were 167 students in
the Indiana University School of Law. It is esti-
mated that at least sixty per cent of them earn at
least one-half of their own expenses; that an addi-
tional fifteen or twenty per cent earn a part and
from five to ten per cent all of their expenses.
I, myself, have known young men who have not
only worked their way through school but have
helped support a widowed mother and smaller
children in the family. Such an experience is not
an unmixed blessing, but it can be done.
And as a last recourse a young man can get
married and have his wife put him through school.
Finally it is argued that there is created a
monopoly and that such a program is wrong on
principle. Which, on the latter point at least, gets
us up (or better, down) into the insecure realm of
philosophy. But we can answer by merely restat-
ing the argument for them; it creates another
monopoly, and is wrong on an assumed principle.
Both propositions involve the rule of regula-
tion as against the principle of freedom of action;
government against individualism. But certainly
those who oppose it would admit the validity of
some regulation (that is, they would keep out the
confirmed embezzler, for example), and there re-
mains only the extent of the application of such a
concession. Which after all gets back to the ques-
tion, are the present evils sufficient to call for ac-
tion? How much public security must we sacrifice
to individual freedom; how much of the latter to
the former? Obviously different individuals and
different times will give varying answers. All we
can do is to measure the temper of the time, for as
has been truly said, "Man acts from adequate mo-
tives relative to his interest, and not on metaphys-
ical speculations."
Is the public misled by incompetent at-
torneys? Is the public here incapable of self-pro-
tection? Is there an evil to be remedied? From
what has been said the answer to the first and
last are self-evident. While it certainly is true that
under our present situation we license an attorney;
we make him an officer of the court; in all truth we
make him an attorney in contemplation of law,
when he may not be one in fact. We deceive the
public and the public is in truth deceived. It has
very little means of knowledge and can have none.
As in all other cases where that disparity exists
between individuals we regulate the conduct of the
one in the position to impose on the other. We
fully regulate the licensing of all other professions
and businesses where the individual represents
himself to be possessed of special knowledge or
ability.
It seems too plain for words that if individual-
ism clings to admission to the legal profession as
its last foothold, the loneliness of the position
alone disproves its validity. Is there not the same
evil present which prompts (with almost universal
approval) regulation of doctors, dentists, pharma-
cists, teachers, and every other profession?
The uniqueness of our position carries with it a
sting of reproach, not only to ourselves, but to all
of the people of the state. But it stings deeper this
body than any other. We should be the leaders in
correcting the evil, and as a result are we not acces-
sories to the misrepresentations and the failures of
justice, which result from the present situation?
We concede that we are leaders: but we fail to lead.
If this association has any real sense of its obliga-
tions to itself and the people of the State of Indiana
it will pledge itself to devote all of its energies to
the passage of this act.
